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Abstract
Was it fair that Harry was hired but not Barry? Was it fair that Pam was fired
instead of Sam? How to ensure fairness when an intelligent algorithm takes these
decisions instead of a human? How to ensure that the decisions were taken based
on merit and not on protected attributes like race or sex? These are the questions
that must be answered now that many decisions in real life can be made through
machine learning. However research in fairness of algorithms has focused on the
counterfactual questions "what if?" or "why?", whereas in real life most subjective
questions of consequence are contrastive: "why this but not that?". We introduce
concepts and mathematical tools using causal inference to address contrastive
fairness in algorithmic decision-making with illustrative thought examples.
1 Introduction
Machine learning based decision systems have achieved near human performance in many tasks in
recent times. But as these algorithms have grown more powerful, they have become more complex
(with numerous parameters) and hence more opaque (the decision making process is not easily
explainable) [1]. Machine learning after all is a data driven optimal function fitting exercise, thus it
has mostly dealt with association, rather than causation [2]. Given, the broad use of machine learning
algorithms in the modern world, precautions to ensure the fairness of the decision making process of
such algorithms is of great importance [3].
The algorithm may take decisions partly based on protected variables (race, gender, sexual orientation,
etc) learned from historic data having inherent bias [4]. Then there is the possibility of such bias
getting perpetuated with significant social consequence for such tasks like job recruitment, university
admission, insurance/lending, preemptive criminal profiling, etc [5, 6] to name a few. Modern
machine learning methods should avoid such unethical discriminatory practice [7]. After all, the
efficacy of a decision making process should be based on both efficiency and ethics [8].
We present contrastive fairness, a new direction in causal inference applied to algorithmic fairness.
Earlier causal inferential methods in algorithmic fairness dealt with the "what if?" question [9]. We
establish the theoretical and mathematical foundations to answer the contrastive question "why this
and not that?". This is essential to defend the fairness of algorithmic decisions in tasks where a person
or sub-group of people is chosen over another (job recruitment, university admission, etc). At its
core, any question of fairness is a comparison, because equality is not absolute in society [10]. Some
discrimination is part of the process itself (say employee recruitment), what must be ensured therefore,
is that the discrimination is on fair grounds. Hence the question of why a certain person was chosen
and not another, is of utmost pertinence. Contrastive questions and their explanation [11] have been
around for quite some time but not within the purview of artificial intelligence and machine learning.
Contrastive explanation in artificial intelligence has only recently been discussed by Miller [12], but
for the first time it is formally introduced to algorithmic fairness in this work. It is to be noted that
the current paper is meant to lay theoretical and mathematical foundations of contrastive logic in the
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realm of algorithmic fairness (Part 1). Data driven applications and experimental evaluations are to
be pursued in future work (Part 2).
2 Background Concepts
The present paper combines two distinct areas of research, those of algorithmic fairness and causal
inference, both comparatively niche areas in machine learning. We provide in this section for the
reader, a brief collection of underlying definitions and concepts related to both of these areas.
2.1 Algorithmic Fairness
We first define a few notations which are used throughout this paper. Let Y be the expected outcome
and Yˆ be the predicted outcome. X is the set of observable attributes and U is the set of latent
attributes of an individual. A is the set of protected attributes of the individual on which the algorithm
should not base its prediction on, in order to be fair. Of course, the intuitive but naive assumption in
that case would be that an algorithm maybe considered to be fair if Yˆ is only dependent on X and
not A. However, this amounts to “fairness through unawareness” as there may be attribute(s) in X
that are analogous to attribute(s) in A, though not explicitly the same. This makes it necessary to
devise more strict rules to ensure algorithmic fairness.
Most earlier notions of algorithmic fairness were global, that is true for the population. The two most
popular among these are Demographic Parity and Equality of Opportunity. Demographic parity holds
if P (Yˆ | A = 0) = P (Yˆ | A = 1), that is, we get the same prediction, irrespective of the value to
which the protected attributes are set at. Note that this does not take into account the expected outcome
Y which means it ensures equality of result over the population, instead of any calibration using
expected outcomes in sub-populations. Equality of opportunity does exactly that, it only seeks to
ensure a certain prediction if the expected outcome supports that prediction for the sub-population in
question. Equality of opportunity holds if P (Yˆ = 1 | A = 0, Y = 1) = P (Yˆ = 1 | A = 1, Y = 1).
It has been shown that these two criteria can never simultaneously hold true [13].
This brings to light the need for individual level fairness criterion, besides the above population
level ones. If individual i and j are similar, that is some distance metric d(i, j) is less than a
small threshold, then individual fairness holds if Yˆ (X(i), A(i)) ≈ Yˆ (X(j), A(j)). Of course, this
introduces the constraint that the metric d(i, j) should be properly chosen, which requires some
domain knowledge expertise.
2.2 Causal Inference
Structural Causal Models (SCM) [14] are the backbone of causal inference methods [15]. These
consist of three major interacting elements: causal diagrams, structural equations, and counterfac-
tual/intervention logic. These together make up the triple of sets (U,X, F ) which constitute the
SCM.
1. Causal graphical diagrams, which are basically directed acyclic graphs (DAG). The nodes
of the diagram are the variables and the directed arrow between them specify the flow of
causal relations between the variables. There are two types of variables: U is the set of
latent background variables and X are observable variables.
2. Structural equations are a set of functions {f1, . . . , fn} ∈ F corresponding to the variables
{X1, . . . , Xn} ∈ X such that Xi = fi(pi, Upi), pi ⊆ X\{Xi} and Upi ⊆ U .
3. For causal inferential analysis, counterfactual and interventional logic are carried out using
a set of rules called do-calculus.
Since causal diagrams are essentially directed acyclic graphs, each observable variable Xi will be
connected to its parent variables pi, where Xi ⊆ X and pi ⊆ X\Xi. Thus we see above that the
value of the observable variable Xi depends on its parent variables as well as the latent variables U ,
through the function fi.
Intervention logic. As seen above, the value of a measurable variable Xi is given by Xi =
fi(pi, Upi). Now if an external agent deliberately sets the value of Xi = x, then that is called an
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intervention (eg. randomised control trials). So assuming that we know the probability distribution
P (U) of latent variables U , we can perform an intervention on Z variables belonging to X (that is
Z ⊆ X), and then compute the resulting probability distribution of the remaining variables in X
other than Z, that is X \ Z.
Counterfactual logic. This then also helps us to do counterfactual calculations, where we essentially
compute P (YZ←z(U) | W = w). Here Y are those variables belonging to the set of observable
variables X , that we want to measure the effect of, so essentially output variables. Z are those
variables that we have intervened on by setting to value z, and W are all other variables with known
probability distribution.
2.3 Counterfactual Fairness
Kusner et al. [9] present the notion of counterfactual fainress. For a given problem of algorithmic
fairness, let the causal model be given as usual by the set tuple (U, V, F ), where V ≡ A ∪X . A are
the protected variables and U are the latent variables. X are the observables variables other than
A, so that they together make up the total set of observable variables V . Yˆ is a fair predictor of the
output variables Y if
P (YˆA←a (U) = y | X = x,A = a) = P (YˆA←a′(U) = y | X = x,A = a) (1)
This condition of counterfactual fairness should be fair for any x, a, a′ and for all y. The equation
essentially enforces the condition that the probability distribution of Y should not be affected if any
of the protected variables are intervened on keeping other conditions same [16].
3 Contrastive Fairness
In this Section we present the idea of contrastive fairness in details which is the main contribution of
this paper. First we present several contrastive fairness questions and then formally formulate them.
We take initial cues from the work on contrastive explanation by Miller [12].
3.1 Why do we need Contrastive Fairness? Why Counterfactual Fairness is not enough?
Counterfactual fairness formalised the use of causal inference in ensuring fairness of machine learning
algorithms. However, the criterion is population based, whereas many real life fairness question
compare how two individuals are treated, and whether the difference in decision for them was fair?
Why was this decision taken for an individual and not some other decision? All these are contrastive
cases of individual fairness, which requires some further considerations to be incorporated. We still
use the same counterfactual logic but expand it to fit contrastive cases.
3.2 Posing Contrastive Questions
First we list the main contrastive causal questions from existing literature. Then we modify them
into contrastive questions pertaining to algorithmic decision making. Lastly we modify them to form
fairness criteria.
Van Bouwel and Weber [17] mention 3 kinds of contrastive causal questions that may be posed.
• P-contrast: Why does object X have property P , rather than property Q?
• O-contrast: Why does object X have property P , but object Y has property Q?
• T-contrast: Why does object X have property P at time t, but property Q at time t′?
This defines three types of contrast: within an object (P-contrast), between objects themselves
(O-contrast), and within an object over time (T-contrast).
We modify these questions to ask algorithmic decision questions as follows:
• D-contrast: Why does individual I receive decision D, rather than decision D′?
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• I-contrast: Why does individual I receive decision D but individual J receives decision D′?
• T-contrast: Why does individual I receive decision D at time t, but decision D′ at time t′?
Again, note the three types of contrast: for one individual (D-contrast), between two individuals
(I-contrast), and for one individual over time (T-contrast).
Then we convert these into contrastive fairness questions, quite simply by rephrasing as follows:
• D-contrast: Is it fair to make decision D for individual I , instead of decision D′?
• I-contrast: Is it fair to make decision D for individual I , while make D′ for individual J?
• T-contrast: Is it fair to make decision D for individual I at time t, but make D′ at time t′?
These three questions framed here give the main groundwork of ensuring contrastive fairness of
algorithmic decision making pertaining to an individual. Next we mathematically formulate these
criteria.
3.3 D-Contrast: Is it fair to make decision D for individual I , instead of decision D′?
This basically boils down to counterfactual fairness but for a particular individual. This is because if
the decision making process is counterfactually fair for that individual for the entire decision space,
then it should be fair when contrasting between any two decision made for that individual. Thus the
the decision making algorithm is fair for a particular individual i if for any valid decision value d, the
following holds.
P (YˆAi←a (Ui) = d | Xi = x,Ai = a) = P (YˆAi←a′(Ui) = d | Xi = x,Ai = a) (2)
Other symbols have same meaning as in eqn. 1. It should be noted that though the above equation
ensures fairness of the decision making process, it does not comment on the fairness of the two
competing decisions themselves. To show that the decision taken, say d, is better than an alternative
decision say d′, the predicted probability score of the former should be greater than the latter as
shown below.
P (Yˆ (Ui) = d | Xi = xi, Ai = ai) > P (Yˆ (Ui) = d′ | Xi = xi, Ai = ai) (3)
3.4 I-Contrast: Is it fair to make decision D for individual I , but make D′ for individual J?
When comparing decisions between two individuals however, we need to make further assumptions.
Not only the decision making processes must be separately fair for both individuals, but also the
difference in decision should be "sensible", that is the probability values generated by the predictor
should support that.
First we establish the fairness for the two individuals for the entire decision space as follows:
P (YˆAi←ai (Ui) = d | Xi = xi, Ai = ai) = P (YˆAi←a′i(Ui) = d | Xi = xi, Ai = ai)
P (YˆAj←aj (Uj) = d | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) = P (YˆAj←a′j (Uj) = d | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) (4)
Next, even if the decision making process itself is fair, for the decision to "make sense", for one
individual the decision taken should have higher probability score assigned by the predictor than the
alternative decision, while the opposite should hold true for the other individual. This is presented
mathematically as follows:
P (Yˆ (Ui) = d | Xi = xi, Ai = ai) > P (Yˆ (Ui) = d′ | Xi = xi, Ai = ai)
P (Yˆ (Uj) = d
′ | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) > P (Yˆ (Uj) = d | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) (5)
4
Lastly, one must make sure that even if the protected variable values of the two individuals were to be
same counterfactually, then also decision D would have higher value than decision D′ for individual
I and decision D′ would have higher value than decision D for individual J . This is present below.
P (YˆAi←aj (Ui) = d | Xi = xi, Ai = ai) > P (YˆAi←aj (Ui) = d
′ | Xi = xi, Ai = ai)
P (YˆAj←ai (Uj) = d
′ | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) > P (YˆAj←ai (Uj) = d | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) (6)
If these equations are satisfied then one can surmise that the contrast in decision made between these
two individuals is fair.
3.5 T-Contrast
The main question being asked here is that if over time the decision made for an individual changes,
is that change fair or not. To ensure this, one has to first verify that the process itself is fair for all
valid decisions d that can be made over all time points t. This is shown here:
P (YˆAi←ai (Ui) = d | Xi = xi(t), Ai = ai) = P (YˆAi←a′i(Ui) = d | Xi = xi(t), Ai = ai) (7)
Now if the original decision was d at time t, and became some other d′ at time t′, then it must also
hold that at time t, decision d had higher prediction than d′, whereas at time t′, the opposite is true.
This is formulated below:
P (Yˆ (Ui) = d | Xi = xi(t), Ai = ai) > P (Yˆ (Ui) = d′ | Xi = xi(t), Ai = ai)
P (Yˆ (Ui) = d
′ | Xi = xi(t′), Ai = ai) > P (Yˆ (Ui) = d | Xi = xi(t′), Ai = ai) (8)
3.6 Illustrative thought example: Fairness of Employee Job Location
Consider two employees P and Q having the same job duties and responsibilities in the same
organisation. The organisation has office locations in London and different other locations in the UK.
Employees might have a preference of working in London, so if they are assigned to a different office
location, the decision making process should be fair. This becomes even more significant for the
organisation, if a contrastive allocation of location between two employees is challenged and needs
to be defended, especially if the decision is taken by an algorithm based on employee background
data and performance statistics. We discuss all the three scenarios of contrastive fairness for this test
case and consider what needs to be shown, in order to prove fairness.
Suppose employee P is joining the organisation and in his/her application form had indicated that
he/she would prefer to be located in the London headquarters, but is being located elsewhere due
to more employee requirements in the satellite office, and this decision is being taken by a machine
learning enabled "HR algorithm". This decision should not be based on such protected attributes
like race, sex, religion, etc. This is an example of D-contrast and to ensure fairness, the algorithm
must satisfy equations 2 and 3. Also consider the case of the same employee P being first located in
London, and then at a later point of time being relocated to another office. In that case, the algorithm
must satisfy the conditions of T-contrast via equations 7 and 8. Lastly consider employee P being
assigned a London office and employee Q being assigned a satellite office and employee Q counters
this decision in the belief that the decision was biased by race. It is of great importance to the
organisation to be able to justify the decision fairness of the "HR algorithm" and that can be achieved
using the I-contrast equations 4, 5 and 6.
3.7 Why make contrastive decision instead of making same decision for both individuals?
A core notion underpinning contrastive fairness is that one decision is more "desirable" than another
and hence the need to justify the difference in decision between two individuals. In that case, a natural
follow-up question that arises is why not make the "desirable" decision for both individuals, why at
all go for the less desirable alternative decision? For example, revisiting the illustrative example in
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Section 3.6, why not locate both employees P and Q in the London office, with the assumption that
this is the more desirable decision, that is both employees prefer to work in London.
To justify the contrastive decision in such a situation, one has to first show that the preferable decision
d had higher probability score for individual I than individual J by enough margin, even when the
protected attributes are swapped or made same as shown below:
P (YˆAi←{ai,aj} (Ui) = d | Xi = xi, Ai = ai)− P (YˆAj←{ai,aj} (Uj) = d | Xj = xj , Aj = aj) > λij
(9)
Besides this, it helps further to justify the decision making process if similar conditions can be shown
for d′ but with individual J having higher probability than individual I , but this is not a necessary
condition. Note that combinations of protected attributes are tried by counterfactual logic to verify
invariance and hence fairness.
P (YˆAj←{ai,aj} (Uj) = d
′ | Xj = xj , Aj = aj)− P (YˆAi←{ai,aj} (Ui) = d′ | Xi = xi, Ai = ai) > λij
(10)
Though fairness of algorithmic decision making is the main objective of the problem at hand, it
should ideally be achieved with non-significant loss in algorithmic performance. If the performance
error is the difference between the predicted output (Yˆ ) and expected output (Y ), then this can be
used along with the fairness criteria as a multi-objective pareto front optimisation, with higher priority
on fairness in general.
4 Test Case: Law School Success Revisited
Though we have formalized contrastive reasoning in the context of algorithmic fairness for the first
time in this work, it falls under the purview of causal inference methods, at the heart of which lies
interventional and counterfactual logic always. So in order to demonstrate how contrastive logic in
fairness builds on the core counterfactual logic, we revisit the same experimental design on law school
success as used in [9]. We first point out how the counterfactual fairness evaluation as described in
[9] might not be adequate under some conditions. After that we move on to explain how contrastive
equations can be utilised to answer further questions using the same framework.
4.1 Population Level Counterfactual Fairness [9]
Dataset. The Law School Admission Council dataset [18] has data on 21,790 law students across
163 United States law schools. For each student, it has information like pre-entrance grade-point
average (GPA) score, law school entrance examination score (LSAT), post-entrance law school first
year grade point average (FYA). The dataset also has some social attributes recorded for students,
like race and sex.
Problem. Predict the FYA with sufficient accuracy based on LSAT and GPA while ensuring it is not
biased by protected attributes like race and sex.
Model. The authors propose 3 levels/types of graphical diagrams to model the problem with some
assumptions. Of these, we only consider the highest level (called Level 3 in [9]) in this work, which
claims to ensure counterfactual fairness under some strong assumptions. The model is presented in
Fig 1(a). The corresponding structural equations have GPA, LSAT and FYA as functions of race (R),
sex (S) [19] and independent error terms as follows:
GPA = bG + wRGR+ w
S
GS + G, G ∼ p(G)
LSAT = bL + wRLR+ w
S
LS + L, L ∼ p(L)
FYA = bF + wRFR+ w
S
FS + F , F ∼ p(F ) (11)
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Figure 1: (a) Causal graphical model of the law school success test case [9]; race and sex are protected
variables, ∗ are latent variables, GPA, LSAT and FYA are measured variables. [9] (b) Even when the
output variable is directly modeled by latent variables, it might still have non-linear dependance on
protected attributes especially by proxy.
Since R and S are the protected attributes, the independent error terms in the linear model (G, L,
F ) are considered to be the latent variables (U from previous sections) the probability distribution
of which must be estimated. The terms b∗ and w∗∗ are the constants and weights respectively of
the standard linear models that are fitted to the data. The latent variables, though assumed to be
independent of protected variables, may have interactions between them, but this is chosen to be
neglected for the model formulation.
Assuming GPA and LSAT be the observed variables, and ˆGPA and ˆLSAT be their corresponding
predictors, then the independent error terms may be estimated as follows. G may be calculated as:
ˆGPA = bG + wRGR+ w
S
GS, G = GPA− ˆGPA
ˆLSAT = bL + wRLR+ w
S
LS, L = LSAT− ˆLSAT (12)
Thereafter using the estimated values of G and L, the predicted value of ˆFYA is calculated as:
ˆFYA = b′F + w
G
F G + w
S
LL (13)
The authors [9] claim that the predictor ˆFYA thus calculated can be taken to be counterfactually fair
since it is only a function of the latent variables that are independent of the protected attributes.
4.2 Advocating Checking of Individual Level Contrastive Fairness Criteria
Limitations of only using counterfactual fairness. The counterfactual fairness model makes quite
strong assumptions regarding linear relation of protected variables (race and sex) and independence
of non-protected variables. This might hold in many cases at a population or even sub-population
level of considerable sample size and randomized representation. However, most causal questions of
fairness in real life are contrastive and many contrastive questions are asked at individual level. The
assumptions of linearity and independence that may hold true at population level might not be valid
per individual. For example, consider the attribute: number of hours of library access after school
hours. This might be a latent variable with an effect on LSAT and GPA and over the entire population
can be considered to be independent of race and sex. But at an individual level the scenario can be
quite different. In fact at an individual level in culturally heterogeneous populations, race might have
an effect on whether a particular sex, say female, can avail sufficient mobility after hours and hence
this can affect access to library or other resources after hours.
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Furthermore, the model itself might need to be different between GPA and LSAT vs. FYA. Eg. the
combined effect of race and sex for an individual on after hours mobility and library access changes
before and after school. Generally, in school a person lives with their parents and they move out
during college. In the latter case guardians have less say and hence mobility will vary a lot between
the two cases. Thus the same variable might have a different structural function in first year of law
school than earlier in high school. Thus we see that at an individual level there are complex non-linear
interactions, interactions by proxy and hence independence is not guaranteed. In fact, in essence it
might get reduced to fairness by unawareness.
This is illustrated in fig. 1(b), where though FYA is modeled using the latent variables in GPA and
LSAT, it might have direct dependency to race and sex, specially by proxy. Now these issues can
partially be aligned and conceptualised from earlier equations as shown below. FYA is the observed
first year grades of the law school students, whereas ˆFYA is the predicted value according to equation
13. Now we claim that due to the above discussed effects, the residual F may still be complexly
dependent on protected attributes at higher orders:
F = FYA− ˆFYA, F = b′′F + f(R,S) + 
′′
F (14)
Here, f(R,S) is some unknown complex higher order function of the protected variables and 
′′
F are
the truly independent latent variables. The problem is how to deal with f(R,S), and it is difficult to
do that with counterfactual fairness at a population level. We show below that contrastive fairness
can be used to mitigate these issues to some extent.
Role of contrastive fairness with deep neural representations. To minimise the effect of higher
order interactions of protected attributes on the predictor, the problem needs to be recast as a cost
function that might be minimised preferably by a neural network that can represent f(R,S) with
sufficient abstraction [20]. This is much easier to do in contrastive case at individual level due to its
inherent difference formulation to perform comparison. For individual I , the predicted FYA is for
simplicity recast below where all the parts independent of race and sex are clumped into f ′i .
ˆFYAi = fi(R,S) + f
′
i (15)
Now when using contrastive logic, we make sure that the decision for individual i, is not affected by
race and sex at a counterfactual level, that is, we have the condition:
J(i) = ˆFYAi − ˆFYA’i = fi(R,S)− fiAi←{a′i} (R,S) + f
′
i − f
′
i = fi(R,S)− fiAi←{a′i} (R,S)
(16)
Here J(i) is the cost function that needs to be minimised with the protected attributes being intervened
(using properties of do-calculus from causal inference theory) counterfactually. Since the other terms
are independent of race and sex they get cancelled. Representing this by a neural network of sufficient
depth to approximate the higher order function f and then minimising the cost function for different
individuals as data points can be expected to mitigate the earlier problems to a large extent.
The same logic can be extended when dealing with contrastive predictions between individuals. Given
the above discussion, the present authors advocate caution while evaluating population level fairness
using counterfactual fairness and suggest that individual level contrastive fairness criteria should also
be taken into account with equal importance.
5 Conclusion
We adopt contrastive logic from causal inference to solve the question of algorithmic fairness in
machine learning. We lay out the mathematical foundations to achieve this with counterfactual logic
at its core. Contratstive questions (why this and not that?) have previously been asked in explainable
artificial intelligence. But for the first time we propose contrastive criteria (is it fair to take one
decision instead of another, differing between two individuals?) in the domain of machine learning.
These generic rules can be adopted for various tasks (eg. HR decisions like job recruitment, company
layovers, etc) which will explored in future application focused research, to expand on the theoretical
framework established in this paper.
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